



TNC'17 Networking Conference, Linz, Austria, 29 May-2 June 2017

An extended analysis of an IoT malware from a blackhole network

A. Dulaunoy*, G. Wagener*, S. Mokkadem* and C. Wagner*


- ♦ Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg CIRCL
- Université Catholique de Louvain
- Fondation RESTENA

Defined by the Oxford dictionnary as


"the interconnection via the Internet of computing devices embedded in everyday objects, enabling them to send and receive data"

What and where is IoT? ... Almost everywhere?





- IoT device design
 - Easy to use for user → most convincing argument
 - Connect and use
 - No tedious configuration needed
 - Fast
 - Only for the purpose of the device (and maybe some data collection?)



- Plethora of security issues
 - Weak to no security features at all
 - Vulnerabilities range from
 - Default passwords
 - "admin" "administrator" "1234" "admin1234" "none"
 - Weak C implementations
 - Devices cannot be patched or only hardly updated (if supported)
 - High exposure to unsophisticated attacks

Blackhole traffic

- Blackhole traffic
 - Routable non-used address space of an ISP
 - Arriving traffic is unidirectional and unsolicited
 - A particularity of the used blackhole
 - Close to private network address space (RFC 1918)
 - Traffic contains
 - Noise and scans for vulnerable systems, ex. SSH brute-force
 - Backscatter traffic, ex. spoofed DoS
 - Self-replicating code using network as vector, ex. Conficker
 - Badly configured devices, ex. printers, server, routers, IoT devices

```
SYSLOG lpr.error printer: offline
or intervention needed

SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper out
...

SYSLOG lpr.error printer: paper jam
```

Blackhole traffic

- The observations from the blackhole
 - Long term analysis
 - Started in 2014
 - presented paper about misconfigured devices @TNC2014
 - 2 IPv4 subnets
 - Close to RFC 1918
 - IoT malware and classical malware
 - Focus on Mirai analysis
 - Other botnet traffic
 - Recent observations after Mirai


lot Malware analysis - Mirai

- Fingerprinting Mirai
 - First appeared in August 2016
 - Strongest attack in IoT history in September 2016
 - Strong DDOS attack against a significant DNS-provider
 - Side effects on other large sites such as OVH, GitHub, Amazon,...
 - Estimated overall throughput of attack reached 1.2 Terabits/s
 - Involved more than 100 000 compromised devices
 - DVR players and digital cameras
 - Few weeks earlier
 - Less strong attack on the security blog "Krebs on Security"
 - Only reached estimated throughput of 665 Gigabits/s

lot Malware analysis - Mirai


- Difference of Mirai to other attacks
 - Executed by compromised easy-to-hack IoT devices
 - On a very large scale
- Mirai was not only a "one time headliner"
- Source code shortly leaked after attack
 - Reach out for devices exposing telnet services on port 23 and 2323 (both TCP)
 - Bruteforce telnet servers with 63 default passwords
- Mirai fingerprint
 - Set the ISN (Initial sequence number) number to port number


lot Malware analysis – Mirai behaviour



lot Malware analysis - Mirai


Distribution of port 23 and 2323 over last 28 months






lot Malware analysis - Mirai

Mirai behaviour from February to April 2017




Evolution of Mirai






Telnet sessions - credentials



Telnet sessions - commands



Other malware observations

Frequency	Port numbers
17 040 164	53413
252 652	9999
11 087	534
7 188	54544
2 666	32764
1 810	5900
1 046	22
782	43413
200	29172
69	3074
25	23
22	53418

- Same blackhole dataset
- Other interesting port numbers
 - Port 53413
 - Port 9999
- Searches showed
 - Vulnerabilities detected for


Netis router

 payload keywords "wget"/"http" used in exploit code

Asus router

 backdoor provides root priviledges

Other malware observations



- First peak close to vulnerability disclosure in 2014
- Second peak in 2015
 - Unique IP-addresses > factor 86
- Third peak in 2016
- Assumption
 - Still attractive for hackers even years after disclosure

Recent Mirai evolutions

- Mirai activities have not ceased yet!
 - Still a lot of Mirai activities observable in blackhole
- New variants have appeared
 - In February 2017 new variant
 - Windows machines compromised by trojans
 - Has built-in bitcoin mining module
 - →Not only DDoS but increase attackers revenue
 - In April 2017
 - Brickerbot
 - → Not only compromises also destoys device by permanent DoS

Conclusion

- Presented observations on Mirai
 - Future work long term observations on IoT malware
- IoT devices are installed and forgotten
 - Easy to use
 - Fast and cheap
 - Do not ask for maintenance
 - No or weak security only
- To reduce impact
 - Awareness next to users
 - Security by design
 - Vulnerabilities reported/shared within cybersecurity community (f.ex: MISP)







QUESTIONS? THANK YOU!



Hack.lu is an open convention/conference where people can discuss about computer security, privacy, information technology and its cultural/technical implication on society.

13th edition (17-19 October 2017) in Luxembourg